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Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc.:
The Status of Foreigner-Foreign State Cross-
Claims Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976
In the 1983 admiralty case, Mim'stry of Supply, Cairo v. Uni'verse Tank-
ships, Inc. ,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the issue
of whether, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19762 (here-
inafter "FSIA" or "the Act"), a cross-claim filed by a foreign corporation
against a governmental agency should be dismissed on the ground of for-
eign sovereign immunity. The court held that the cross-claim was ex-
empted from sovereign immunity 3 and further held that the FSIA
exception withdrawing sovereign immunity with respect to counter-
claims did not implicitly foreclose application of other FSIA exceptions. 4
The decision furnishes an important judicial interpretation of an issue
not directly encompassed in the Act.
On March 14, 1979, Universe Tankships, Inc., a Liberian corpora-
tion with an office in New York, entered into a one-year time charter of
the motorship Ulysses with Babanaft, a Panamanian corporation head-
quartered in Greece. Universe contracted to make and maintain the
Ulysses fit for service. Babanaft entered into a voyage charter with
Claybridge Shipping Co., which subsequently contracted with Ministry
of Supply, 5 whereby Claybridge agreed to transport a cargo of wheat
from the United States to Egypt. When the shipment arrived at Port
Said, Egypt, the cargo was delivered "short or otherwise damaged."
Ministry brought suit for cargo damages against the ship MIS Ulysses,
Universe Tankships, Inc., and Claybridge Shipping Co., S.A. 6
1 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
2 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (3), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1601-1611 (1976).
3 708 F.2d at 85.
4 Id at 86.
5 The Ministry is engaged in carrying out in the United States a program for the
purchase of grain and its transport to Egypt, under P.L. 480, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1431, 1691-
1736(n) (1982). 708 F.2d at 82. P.L. 480 is a United States government program under which
the Department of Agriculture provides financing for sales of food by American corporations to
friendly foreign countries. See Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Organization for Chcmi-
cals and Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1981).
6 708 F.2d at 81-82. Ministry initially demanded arbitration. The Ulysses submitted to
arbitration with Babanaft but denied the jurisdiction of the district court over it in the action
brought by Ministry. Id. at 82.
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Babanaft moved to intervene as a plaintiff against Universe. 7
Babanaft later amended its complaint, annexing a cross-claim against
Ministry which alleged that Ministry had wrongfully halted the dis-
charge at Port Said and thus wrongfully denied Babanaft rightful use of
the vessel under its time charter with Universe. Ministry moved for dis-
missal of the cross-claim. 8
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that Babanaft's cross-claim was barred on the ground of sovereign immu-
nity.9 The court found no exception under the "commercial activities"
clause of section 1605(a)(2)10 because there was no direct effect on the
United States, and it held that the counterclaim exception of section
16071" applied only to counterclaims. 12
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the cross-claim was ex-
empted under the first clause of section 1605(a)(2). 13 More important,
the court further held that the exclusion of a section in the FSIA explic-
itly dealing with cross-claims did not implicitly foreclose application of
other exceptions within the Act to cross-claims.14
The court emphasized that the exception in the first clause of sec-
tion 1605(a)(2)1 5 withdrawing sovereign immunity must be read in light
of the definitions provided in section 1603.16 The court concluded that
when a foreign state has carried on a commercial activity within the
7 Babanaft's complaint alleged that the Egyptian consignees and port officials halted dis-
charge of the cargo as a result of heavy metal rust scale from the ship's cargo compartment
having intermixed with the grain. The period of discharge was thereby prolonged for nearly
three months, during which time Babanaft incurred the cost of charter hire and fuel and lost the
use of the ship. Id. at 82.
8 Id. at 83.
9 Id. The unpublished opinion and order of the district judge was filed December 14,
1982.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) provides that:
(a) a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1976) provides that:
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state intervenes, in
a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state shall not be accorded
immunity with respect to any counterclaim-
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity under § 1605
of this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate action against the
foreign state.
Id
12 708 F.2d at 83.
1'3 Id at 84.
14 Id. at 86.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
16 708 F.2d at 84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(d) and (e) provide:
(d) A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial con-
duct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of
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United States, the first clause of section 1605(a)(2) withdraws immunity
with respect to claims based not only on acts performed within the
United States, but also with respect to acts performed outside of the
United States if they comprise an integral part of the state's "regular
course of commercial conduct" or a "particular commercial transaction"
having substantial contact with the United States.1 7 The court found
substantial contacts in Ministry's purchase of wheat unider P.L. 48018
and in its arrangement for the carriage of the grain to Egypt.' 9
The court also held that Congress, by making a separate exception
for counterclaims did not intend to limit other FSIA claims brought in
separate actions against a foreign sovereign, thereby leaving sovereign
immunity a bar to all cross-claims.20 It determined that section 160721
was intended to reduce the scope of sovereign immunity, not to foreclose
cross-claims. 22 The court concluded that the language of section
1605(a)(2) is broad enough to include a cross-claim and that no good
reason exists why Congress would have intended to preserve sovereign
immunity when a foreign state's commercial activity is the subject of a
cross-claim, while withdrawing that immunity when the foreign state is a
party against which a counterclaim is brought.
23
To understand the significance of the court's decision in Mislry of
Supply, it is necessary to examine the development of sovereign immunity
in the United States.24 The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first rec-
ognized in the United States in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon25 in
1812. In The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court held a plea of immu-
nity, which was supported by an executive branch request, to be consis-
tent with the public law and practice of nations. 26 In the early part of
this century, American courts began to place less emphasis on whether
immunity was supported by the law .and practice of nations, but rather
relied upon the practices and policies of the State Department. 2 7 This
practice reached its zenith in Ex Parle Repubhc of Peru,28 in which the
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
(e) A "commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state"
means commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial con-
tact with the United States.
17 708 F.2d at 84.
18 See supra note 5.
19 708 F.2d at 84-85.
2 o Id at 86.
21 28 U.S.C. § 1607.
22 708 F.2d at 86.
23 Id
24 For an excellent survey of the background of sovereign immunity doctrine, see von
Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunittes Act of /976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 34-43
(1976).
25 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
26 Id. at 145-46.
27 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprnted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONe;. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6606 [hereinafter cited as House Report].
28 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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Supreme Court declared that it was the "duty" of the judiciary to accept
and to follow the executive branch's determination of sovereign
immunity.
2 9
In order to clarify its position on sovereign immunity, and to make
certain that the immunity determinations of the United States were con-
sistent with the practices of other nations, the State Department infor-
mally adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the "Tate
Letter."' 30 Under the restrictive theory, a foreign state is entitled to im-
munity for its public acts, but not for its private or commercial acts. 3 1
Prior to this time, the United States followed the absolute theory of im-
munity, under which a sovereign must consent to the jurisdiction of the
courts of another country, regardless of the act in question.
32
Recognizing that governments were engaging in commercial activ-
ity with greater frequency, the State Department felt it necessary to
adopt the restrictive theory to insure that the rights of U.S. persons doing
business with a foreign government would be determined by U.S.
courts.33 Until the passage of the FSIA in 1976, courts deferred to the
immunity determinations of the State Department.
34
The position taken by the U.S. courts presented several problems. 35
First, the State Department was not structured to take evidence, to hear
witnesses, or to afford appellate review of its immunity determinations. 36
Second, the strong pull of diplomatic and political influence made it dif-
ficult for the State Department to apply the doctrine of the Tate Letter
consistently. 37 Finally, the courts found themselves outside the main-
stream of international law because virtually every other country consid-
ered the question of sovereign immunity as a judicial, rather than an
executive, determination. 38
In response to these problems, Congress passed the Foreign Sover-
29 Id at 588-89. See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1944) ("It is,
therefore, for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to
allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize") (foot-
note omitted).
30 Letter from State Department Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney
General Phillip B. Perlman (May 11, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
31 Id
32 Id.
33 Id
34 See, e.g., Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964)
(formulating a test for determining whether an act is public or private and commercial, absent
any official State Department communication), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See also, Petrol
Shipping Co. v. Kingdom of Greece, 336 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931
(1966); Rovin Sales Co. v. The Socialist Republic of Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. I11.
1976).
35 For a discussion of the problems under the doctrine announced in the Tate Letter, supra
note 30, see Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States - A Proposalfor Reform of United States Law,
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 905-13 (1969).
36 House Report, supra note 27, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6607.
3 7 Id
38 Id. at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 6608.
[VoL. 9
1984] MINISTRY OF SUPPLY, CAIRO V UNIVERSE TANKSHIPS 511
eign Immunities Act of 1976. 39 Its purpose was to enumerate the circum-
stances under which parties could bring an action against a foreign state,
and when a foreign state was entitled to sovereign immunity.40 A further
purpose of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive theory,4 1 thereby trans-
ferring determinations of sovereign immunity from the executive branch
to the judiciary, and assuring that immunity decisions would not be sub-
ject to political or diplomatic pressures. 42
The FSIA grants original jurisdiction to district courts, without re-
gard for amount in controversy, over any in personam nonjury civil action
against a foreign state4 3 in which it is determined that the foreign state is
not entitled to immunity. 44 Section 1604 of the Act sets forth the general
grant of immunity to a foreign state from the jurisdiction of United
States courts, 4 5 subject to certain exceptions. 46 Congress clearly intended
that the requirements of minimum contacts and adequate notice be
observed. 47
A number of cases decided under the "commercial activities" excep-
tion of section 1605(a)(2) provide guidance in cases involving sovereign
immunity. In the leading case of Texas Traditg and Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republ'c of Nigeria ,48 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals established five
threshold issues which must be resolved in order to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(2). 49 In Texas Trading, the claims arose
out of Nigeria's breach of contracts to purchase cement, and breach of
related letters of credit. In holding that the district court had jurisdiction
under the Act, the court set forth a standard for jurisdiction which it
contended fit the congressional intent underlying the Act.
50
The five critical issues enumerated by the court are: (1) does the
39 FSIA, supra note 2.
40 House Report, supra note 27, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6604.
41 Id at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6605.
42 Id , reprited in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6605-06.
43 A "foreign state" is defined in the Act to include "a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1604 provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
46 The exceptions to sovereign immunity are provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1606, 1607.
47 House Report, supra note 27, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6612.
48 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). For critical surveys of
decisions under the Act, see Brower, Bistline, & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
/976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200 (1976); Carl, Suing Foretign Governments in American Courts.-
The United States Foreign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1109 (1979); Kahale & Vega,
Immunities and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); von Mehren, supra note 24.
49 647 F.2d at 306.
50 Id
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conduct the action is based upon or related to qualify as "commercial
activity"; 5 1 (2) does the commercial activity bear the relation to the
cause of action and the United States described by one of the three
phrases of section 1605(a)(2), warranting the court's exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction under section 1330(a); 52 (3) does exercise of this Con-
gressional subject matter lie within the permissible limits of the "judicial
power" set forth in Article III; 5 3 (4) do subject matter jurisdiction under
section 1330(a) and service of process under section 1608 exist, thereby
making personal jurisdiction proper under section 1330(b); 54 and (5)
does the exercise of personal jurisdiction under section 1330(b) comply
with the due process clause, thus making personal jurisdiction possible? 55
All of these questions must be answered in the affirmative to a establish
proper exercise of jurisdiction.
A number of cases indicate that the conduct giving rise to the cause
of action need not occur in the United States. In Gemini Shipping, Inc. v.
Foreign Trade Organizationfor Chemicals and Foodstuff ,56 the Second Circuit
found statutory subject matter jurisdiction under the first clause of the
commercial activities exception. The Syrian defendants in Gemini guar-
anteed payment for a shipment of grain from the United States to Syria,
but breached the guarantee agreements after the grain reached its desti-
nation. 57 The court held that the breach was a commercial activity, rea-
soning that Congress intended the phrase "carried out in the United
States" to include commercial activities having "substantial contact with
the United States." a5 8 Characterizing the rice sale carried out under P.L.
48059 as the underlying commercial activity having substantial contact
with the United States, the court broadly construed the guarantee as
part and parcel of the sale.6°
The Second Circuit's interpretation is consistent with the Third Cir-
cuit's decision in Sugarman v. Aeromexi'co, Inc. 61 The plaintiff in Sugarman
51 Id
52 Id. at 307-08.
53 Id. at 308.
54 Id
55 Id The court further elaborated that defendant's contacts with the forum had to meet
due process standards of minimum contacts. The court must examine the extent to which de-
fendants availed themselves of the privileges of U.S. law, the extent to which litigation in the
United States would be foreseeable to them, the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in the
United States, and the countervailing interests of the United States in hearing the suit. See also
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980). For a discussion on the problems caused by application of the minimum
contacts test to aliens, see Lillyjuri dicdon Over Domest,& andAlien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85,
124-27 (1983).
56 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981).
57 Id at 318-19.
5 8 Id at 319.
59 See supra note 5.
60 647 F.2d at 319.
61 626 F.2d 812 (3d Cir.),cert. dened, 102 S. Ct. 1297 (1981). (In suit brought under FSIA
and the Seamans Wage Act, court held that it is immaterial that the acts constituting the
breach of contract may have taken place outside the United States because the alleged miscon-
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was stranded for fifteen hours in the Alcapulco airport during a round
trip Aeromexico flight. He subsequently brought suit against Aeromex-
ico claiming that he suffered physical and mental injuries and financial
loss from the airline's delay.62 Basing its decision on the first clause of
the commercial activities exception, the court found a sufficient nexus
between the cause of action and the United States to support jurisdic-
tion. 63 In support of its decision, the court emphasized that the airline
ticket was purchased in a state where Aeromexico maintained an office,
and that the delayed round trip was bound for New York.6
4
Two decisions, however, establish a limit on the extraterritorial
reach of the first clause of section 1605(a)(2). In Gilson v. Republic of Ire-
land,65 and East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. v. Terra,66 the
courts ruled that communication from abroad by mail, telephone, or tel-
egraph is not a commercial activity having substantial contact with the
United States. 67 Therefore, while an act complained of need not occur
within the United States, it must be based upon substantial commercial
activity within the United States.
In Carey v. National Oil Corp. ,68 the court held that neither Libya nor
a corporation wholly owned by the Libyan Government was amenable
to suit in the United States on any claim arising out of contacts between
a Bahamian subsidiary of a New York corporation and the Libyan in-
strumentality. 69 The court emphasized that the legislative history of sec-
tion 1605(a)(2) made clear that it embodies the standards set out in
International Shoe v. Washington.70
Recently, in Verinden B. V v. Central Bank of AVeria,71 the Supreme
Court established that, under the FSIA, foreigners may bring actions
against foreign states in U.S. courts. In Verlinden, a Dutch corporation
brought a suit against an instrumentality of the Nigerian government,
alleging anticipatory breach of a letter of credit. 72 The Supreme Court
held that Congress did not exceed the scope of Article III of the Constitu-
tion by granting to federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over
certain civil actions by foreign parties.73 While the Article III diversity
duct does not have to occur in the United States if the claims arose out of a course of commer-
cial activity in the United States).
62 626 F.2d at 270-71.
63 Id. at 272-73.
64 Id.
65 517 F. Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1981).
66 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979).
67 517 F. Supp. at 483; 467 F. Supp. at 390.
68 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
69 Id. at 676-77.
70 Id. at 676. See also, House Report, supra note 27, at 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6605-07.
71 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
72 Id. at 1966. V1rlinden was one of six consolidated lawsuits in the Second Circuit involv-
ing suits against Nigeria and the Central Bank of Nigeria arising out of contracts with U.S.
suppliers to purchase cement. For a factual summary, see Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 303-06.
73 103 S. Ct. at 1970-71.
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clause is not broad enough to support such subject matter jurisdiction,
the "arising under" clause constitutes an appropriate basis for the statu-
tory grant of jurisdiction. 74 Most importantly, the Court held that the
FSIA does not merely concern access to the federal courts, but rather
governs the type of actions for which foreign sovereigns may be held lia-
ble in a federal court. 75 Thus, a foreign sovereign, or an agency thereof,
is amenable to suit in the United States on the basis of the nature and
substantiality of its activities in the United States. The nationality of the
plaintiff is irrelevant.
The decision in Ministry is consistent with the cases above, and it
provides a significant interpretation of a novel issue under the FSIA.
The court pronounced a rule respecting a cross-claim filed by a foreigner
against a co-plaintiff foreign state, arising from allegedly wrongful acts
committed outside the United States pursuant to a commercial transac-
tion conducted partially within the United States. While the status of
cross-claims is treated neither in the Act nor in its legislative history, the
court interpreted the intent of the Act to encompass federal jurisdiction
over foreigner-foreign state cross-claims when the cause of action is based
upon the foreign state's commercial activity within the United States.
The court's determination that an exception to sovereign immunity
exists when the activities giving rise to the cause of action are conducted
only partially within the United States is consistent with previous inter-
pretations of "commercial activities" under the FSIA. Furthermore, the
court correctly concluded that the facts of Mnistry satisfy the Texas Trad-
ing test. 76 Since Ministry carried out the grain deal under P.L. 480, 7 7 its
course of conduct qualified as a "commercial activity within the United
States" under sections 1603(d) and (e). Consistent with Gemini, 78 Minis-
try's activities fell within the ambit of the first clause of section
1605(a)(2), thereby warranting the court's exercise of subject matter ju-
risdiction. As Verhden indicated, a cause of action between two foreign
parties which has a sufficient nexus with the United States lies within the
limits of judicial power prescribed by Article III of the Constitution. 79
Finally, Ministry's contacts with the United States through the grain
deal fulfill the "minimum contacts" requirement of the due process
74 Id. See Osburn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824)
("When a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the Constitution
forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit
Courts jurisdiction of that cause."). See also, 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.0614] n.i I (2d
ed. 1980) (Osburn supports federal jurisdiction over foreigner-foreign state suits).
75 103 S. Ct. at 1983. See generally Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns.- A Procedural Compass, 34
STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); Note, Suts by Foreigners Against Foreign States in United States Courts: A
Selective Expansion ofJurisdictlin, 90 YALE L.J. 1891 (1981).
76 See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
77 See supra note 5.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
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clause, thereby making the exercise of personal jurisdiction under section
1330(b) proper.
As Verlinden provided, the fact that both parties are foreign is not a
controlling factor. Rather, the sufficiency of the foreign state's contacts
with the forum dictates whether the foreign entity is amenable to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Allowing Babanaft to litigate its cross-
claim against Ministry in a U.S. court does not represent an extension of
the reach of federal jurisdiction under the FSIA. Ministry's contacts
with the forum through its commercial transactions fit comfortably
within the language of section 1605(a)(2). Also, Ministry had availed
itself of the forum by bringing its action against Universe Tankships.
The decision in M'nzstr may encourage foreigners to bring suit
against foreign states in U.S. courts more frequently. This expanded ac-
cess to U.S. courts presents several potential problems. 80 First, the
United States must incur both the pecuniary and temporal expenses of
adjudicating claims between foreigners. In addition, litigating the suit in
the United States may present various inconveniences to the parties.81 82
Moreover, there exists the potential of damaging foreign relations by try-
ing suits based upon conduct within the territory of another state. Fi-
nally, the courts in the United States are placed in the untenable position
of interpreting and applying foreign law.
Counterbalancing these problems, the United States does have an
interest in trying some suits between foreigners. First, it can deter unde-
sirable behavior affecting the United States. Second, overall efficiency is
served by adjudicating all of the issues arising out of the same nucleus of
facts in a single action. Finally, the availability of dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens mitigates any significant inconven-
ience placed upon the parties if a more convenient forum exists.83
The decision in Ministry does not broadly expand the access of for-
eign parties to U.S. courts. Clearly, a cross-claim based upon a cause of
80 See generally Note, supra note 75, at 1870-79 (discussing the desirability of resolution of
foreigner-foreign state suits in the United States).
81 E.g., compulsory process over witnesses and documents may not be obtained. See
Papegeorgiou v. Lloyd's of London, 436 F. Supp. 701, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (dismissing suit in
favor of foreign forum in part because witnesses available there were beyond the subpoena
power of U.S. courts); Schertenleib v. Traun, 589 F.2d 1156, 1165 (2d Cir. 1978) (dismissing in
part because documents were beyond court's subpoena power, but not beyond that of alterna-
tive forum). Also, the costs of transporting and presenting evidence may be excessive. See Fitz-
gerald v. Westland Marine Corp., 369 F.2d 499, 501 (dismissing suit in part because of costs of
bringing witnesses from alternative jurisdiction); Schertenleib, 589 F.2d at 1165 (dismissing suit
on ground that substantial expense of translating evidence could be avoided if suit were tried in
Switzerland).
82 See Del Rio v. Ballenger Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D.S.C. 1975) (forum non
conveniens dismissal appropriate in part because courts of Panama more competent to apply
their own law).
83 See generally Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, Inunctions Against Suit and Full Faith and
Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 740, 749 (1962) (crowding of local dockets weighs in favor of forum
non conveniens dismissal in primarily foreign controversies); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 205-12 (2d ed. 1980).
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action arising out of the same transaction or occurence as the foreign
state's original claim falls comfortably within the jurisdictional limits of
the FSIA and the Constitution. If a foreign state sees fit to bring suit in a
U.S. court pursuant to its commercial activities within the United States,
no compelling reason exists to deny a foreign co-plaintiff the right to
pursue a cross-claim when the cross-claimant establishes an exception to
sovereign immunity under the Act. It remains to be seen whether the
benefits of adjudicating claims which affect the United States in U.S.
courts outweigh the costs of the resultant expansion of access to U.S.
courts now afforded foreign parties. Irrespective of any countervailing
costs, the decision in Minsty establishes a well-reasoned rule with respect
to cross-claims between foreigners and foreign states under the FSIA.
-GREGORY ScoTr PRENTZAS
